Date: Fri, 06 Oct 1995 17:18:35 -0600
From: "Stephen Evans" [email protected]
Subject: Re: Justice in Buddhism?
And I, on the other hand, think that "justice" is a hangup of monotheistic religions that are afflicted with a judgmental god. It… … when, in so far as I know, the Buddhist teachings refer to wisdom and compassion, but never to justice.
Well, one of the traditional, commentarial explanations of //upekkaa//, usually translated "equanimity" is — even handedness, like a judge. moreover, there is a tradition of Vinaya adjudication in which justice seems a concern.
Santipala
Date: Sat, 07 Oct 1995 13:13:37 -0400
From: "Peter D. Junger" [email protected]
Subject: Re: Justice in Buddhism?
But surely even-handedness is more like "equity" than it is like justice. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes a distinction between justice and ethics: justice consists of following the rules, equity consists of doing right in those cases where justice leads to the wrong result.
I am not at all surprised that the traditional Buddhists teachings make a virtue out of equity in this sense–in the sense of doing what is right, right here, right now, in this particular case–but that does not suggest to me that there was anything like the traditional idea of justice–following rules, recognizing rights–in those teachings.
Peter D. Junger
Case Western Reserve University Law School
Cleveland, OH
Date: Sat, 07 Oct 1995 17:31:38 -0400
From: "Peter D. Junger" [email protected]
Subject: Re: Justice in Buddhism? Correcting a typo
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes a distinction between justice and ethics. justice consists of following the rules… equity consists of doing right in those cases where justice leads to the wrong result.
I meant, of course to say that in the Nicomacean Ethics Aristotle makes a distinction between justice and "equity".
Mea culpa
Date: Tue, 10 Oct 1995 06:15:15 -0600
From: "Dan Lusthaus" [email protected]
Subject: Re: Justice in Buddhism?
I’m away from my computer for a few days, and return to find it packed with an intensive discussion. I haven’t waded through everything yet, but some quick comments:
1. On contract: Contract as a basis for law did not originate in the 19th century, but goes back at least as far as the Hebrew Scriptures. God makes a Covenant (fancy word for "contract") with the people. While Buddhism does not have a covenant with God per se (although, one could argue some Mahayanic forms, such as Pure Land, presuppose some form of contractual agreement between devotees and grace-ful Buddhas), the vinaya code does indeed have elements of contract in it. By taking the vows one signs a verbal contract to conform to certain activities of body, speech, and mind. Various transgressions can get one censured, and even kicked out of the community. The contract itself is not held as the foundation of the agreement (that is deferred to the presumed purpose for which the contract is drawn up in the first place), but it is binding on all parties.
2. As for the rights vs. anaatman debate (and its correlaries), there seem to be some basic confusions. First, in the West, at least since Kant, philosophers have tended to distinguish Critical Reason from Practical Reason. The former concerns ultimate epistemological issues and the ability to make metaphysical claims; the latter is concerned with moral and ethical instruction and practice. They operate through different rational foundations. Similarly, in Buddhism, anaatman doctrine never prohibited anyone from using the first person pronouns, especially in the context of practice. Individuals have their own karmic issues to unravel and correct; to the extent this is an individual concern and practice, there are individuals. To the extent that no Self lies behind the karmic process, there are no metaphysical individuals.
3. It seems appropriate that the majority of Buddhist texts cited as possible sources of ethical material in the discussion (at least as far as I’ve seen so far) come from the Paali canon. Let me suggest a few further suttas for consideration:
1. Madhura sutta (Majjhima Nikaaya #84) which, in the course of arguing why members of the four castes are ultimately equal – though not so in social practice – uses a very capitalist argument (in the good sense).
2. Ka.n.nakattha sutta (Majjhima #90) which, buried amidst other concerns, argues that the two top castes only seem to be superior to the lower two because of a difference in training (= social conditioning), not inherent differences between the individuals in such castes (a theme further expounded in Vaase.t.tha sutta, Majjhima #98).
3. Esukaari sutta (Majjhima #96) is perhaps the most pregnant with possibilities for a Buddhist discourse to parallel "rights" discourse. Arguing against the notion of Brahmanic superiority and the caste hierarchy as conceived by Brahmans, it offers some interesting criteria for analysing "advantage" and "responsibility".
4. When all else fails, religions can always fall back on fire and brimstone preaching, and Dhaana~njaani sutta, Majjhima #97, is a potent example of that genre.
These fours suttas can all be found translated in volume II of the PTS _Middle Length Sayings_. I don’t have time to summarize them now, but highly recommend that discussants read them. They offer much of value.
Dan Lusthaus
Macalester College