Agganna Sutta & 'social contract'
Peter Junger questions whether the //Agga~n~na Sutta// passage I have referred to contains any idea of a social contract, though he unfamiliar with the passage except as I have so far described it. Perhaps it would be useful to say more on it.
The passage in question comes as part of an account of how human society as we now know it devolved from a previously (relatively) idyllic state in which there was originally no need to grow food, and thus no need for private property. Due to the greed of the beings in this state, the abundant natural food supply declines and people have to start cultivating fields, and decide 'So now let us divide up the rice into fields with boundaries', ie. property and ownership was invented. Once this developed, theft followed in its wake. When thieves repeated their theft, in spite of being sternly warned, they were beaten up, 'And in this way...taking what was not given, and censuring, and lying, and punishment, took their origin. Then those beings came together and lamented the arising of these evil things among them... And they thought, "Suppose we were to appoint a certain king who would show anger where anger was due, censure those who deserved it, and banish those who deserved banishment! //And in return//, we would grant him a share of the rice". So they went to the one among them who was the handsomest, the best-looking, the most pleasant and capable, and asked him to do this //in return for a share of the rice, and he agreed//'. (//Diigha Nikaaya II.92-93, as translated by M.Walshe, //Thus Have I Heard- The Long Discourses of the Buddha//, Wisdom, pp.412-13)
The passages highlighter in // // suggest that some sort of bargain or contract is being described. Of course, the most this could be seen to do would be to establish certain duties of a ruler to his human subjects, and their corresponding rights. More general rights of sentient beings, apart from extra, specifically //human// rights, need to be seen as separately supported, as I have already tried to argue, based on sympathy for fellow beings.
"peter.harvey" writes:
: Peter Junger questions whether the //Agga~n~na Sutta// passage I have
: referred to contains any idea of a social contract, though he unfamiliar
: with the passage except as I have so far described it. Perhaps it would
: be useful to say more on it.
And then does say quite a bit more about it. Unfortunately I still do not see any ``social contract'' there.
What I see is a portion of a creation myth in which someone is paid to be the first ruler in exchange for his promise to be a good ruler. And apparently the ruler does keep his promise, so we do not even learn whether that particular promise was legally or morally binding, whether that promise was an enforceable contract.
But even if we do consider that promise to be a contract, it was not a social contract, for the only person bound by it was the king.
Now, from this mythical beginning, it may have become the custom that the king's successors were supposed to behave in certain ways, but such a custom is something very different from a contract (even a social contract). And anyway I don't see any suggestion in the //Sutta//, as restated at least, that suggests that I, who am not a member of that first mythical community, am in anyway given any rights by that first king's promise (or that President Clinton is somehow bound by that promise).
At 12:43 04/10/95 -0400, Peter D. Junger wrote:
>What I see is a portion of a creation myth in which someone is paid to be the
>first ruler in exchange for his promise to be a good ruler. And apparently the
>ruler does keep his promise, so we do not even learn whether that particular
>promise was legally or morally binding, whether that promise was an enforceable
>contract.
I think the idea was that the king would do a little bit more than just make a promise, and would actually have to discharge the functions of a king in return for the privileges of kingship. The agreement would seem to be morally binding and probably legally so, in that it appears to involve the essential elements of a legally binding contract.
>But even if we do consider that promise to be a contract, it was not a social
>contract, for the only person bound by it was the king.
Surely the people -- as the other party -- were bound by it as well? The people got together and elected one of their number to be king, so everyone was party to the decision in some way. This sounds pretty much like a social contract.
>Now, from this mythical beginning, it may have become the custom that the king's
>successors were supposed to behave in certain ways, but such a custom is
>something very different from a contract (even a social contract).
Perhaps the "custom" should be analysed as the renewal of the contract on each coronation. Each new king would take an oath, and so forth, pledging to fulfil his duty to the people in return for whatever benefits kings get.
And anyway I don't see any suggestion in the ///Sutta//, as restated at least, that suggests that I, who am not a member of that first mythical community, am in anyway given any rights by that first king's promise (or that President Clinton is somehow bound by that promise).
Perhaps not, but the point seems to be whether or not Buddhism recognizes the concept of a "social contract," not whether the mythical original is actually in force now.
Damien Keown writes:
: At 12:43 04/10/95 -0400, Peter D. Junger wrote
:
:
: >What I see is a portion of a creation myth in which someone is paid to
: >be the first ruler in exchange for his promise to be a good ruler.
: >And apparently the ruler does keep his promise, so we do not even
: >learn whether that particular promise was legally or morally binding,
: >whether that promise was an enforceable contract.
:
: I think the idea was that the king would do a little bit more than just make
: a promise, and would actually have to discharge the functions of a king in
: return for the privileges of kingship. The agreement would seem to be
: morally binding and probably legally so, in that it appears to involve the
: essential elements of a legally binding contract.
That simply is not possible. There are no essential elements of a legally binding contract until some form of law is instituted. This creation myth doesn't get to the establishment of law and it certainly does not say anything about the establishment of the law of contract. (I doubt that any Buddhist just-so story about the beginning of things would contain a section about the development of the law of contract, it is, after all, a concept that is pretty much an invention of modern Western jurists and philosophers.) And anyway, since the king did keep the promise, we have no way--no judicial opinion or whatever--to tell whether it was legally binding. (If I promise to give you a quarter and I then give you a quarter, that tells us nothing about whether my promise was legally binding--though any first year law student in the United States (where law is not taught to undergraduates) would tell you that the promise was not binding.)
: >But even if we do consider that promise to be a contract, it was not a
: >social contract, for the only person bound by it was the king.
:
: Surely the people -- as the other party -- were bound by it as well? The
: people got together and elected one of their number to be king, so everyone
: was party to the decision in some way. This sounds pretty much like a social
: contract.
A decision is not a contract. Apparently the people did carry out the king's dictates. That is not following a contract. (One of the big difficulties with the idea of a social contract is that the more you know about contracts the less coherent that idea sounds.)
: >Now, from this mythical beginning, it may have become the custom that
: >the king's successors were supposed to behave in certain ways, but
: >such a custom is something very different from a contract (even a
: >social contract).
:
: Perhaps the "custom" should be analysed as the renewal of the contract on
: each coronation. Each new king would take an oath, and so forth, pledging to
: fulfil his duty to the people in return for whatever benefits kings get.
I suppose that it //could// be analyzed in that fashion. But it certainly is not a clear way to look at things. In fact, it begs the question, since if you analyze customs as contracts then one can no longer distinguish between what is customary and what is the result of a legally enforceable promise. (And since morals are derived from //mores//, it turns out that all morality is simply a matter of contract.)
I pray that we not try to import some sort of contract theory into Buddhism. And to the extent that we do agree that we should try to establish some sort of supra national legal system of human rights, I pray that we do not think that that system need contain any contract law. (But then I teach Property and Restitution and think that Contracts is sort of silly.)