Human Rights Position Statement: Soraj Hongladarom
Soraj Hongladarom
Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts
Chulalongkorn University
Bangkok 10330, THAILAND
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Position Statement on Buddhism and Human Rights
In my conference paper, I showed that there is a contrast between two leading Thai thinkers on this problem. Phra Dhammapidok argues that human rights presuppose divisiveness and contentiousness, which then are not conducive to the ideal end of Buddhism. Social critic Sulak Sivaraksa, on the other hand, thinks the human rights are constitutive of the ideal end itself; thus Buddhism has much to offer to the struggle for greater awareness and actualization of the rights. In the paper I left the question open regarding who is right on this matter and did not discuss it, for that would require another paper in itself. However, in this position statement I would like to sketch a possible answer to the question. I think Theravaada Buddhism itself is neutral on this issue. That is, it neither affirms nor denies that the concept of human rights is inherent to it. Here I speak only of the Theravaada tradition, for that is the tradition in which I grow up and know better than any other. That Theravaada Buddhism is neutral on this does not mean that it is withdrawn or cut off from life outside the monastery. Far from it, the neutrality, in my view, makes possible an open space whereby debates and disagreements can occur on how best to accommodate people who are not enlightened, how best for almost all of us, who cannot get rid of egoistic tendencies, to live together.
Moreover, the neutrality points to the *pragmatic* nature of Buddhism. In one of the Sutras, the Buddha told a story of a man suffering from an arrow. The immediate need for the man is to get rid of the arrow and treat the wound as soon as possible; but if the man or those around him insists on asking such questions as where the arrow came from, from what material it was made, and so on, the man himself might not be able to live long. These questions are irrelevant to the man's suffering, so are all philosophical speculations which detach people from making a direct effort to end their //dukkha.//
So debates on whether there are human rights in Buddhism is comparable to the needless questions in the parable. What should be immediately attended to is that proper action take place, not just debates. This does not, however, necessarily mean that all philosophical discussions or debates are useless, in my view. But it accentuates the point that for Buddhism the only course is toward cessation ofsufferings, and if discussions and debates contribute to that end, then they are valuable.
>Soraj Hongladarom
>Department of Philosophy
>Faculty of Arts
>Chulalongkorn University
>Bangkok 10330, THAILAND
>----------------------------------------
>Position Statement on Buddhism and Human Rights
>In my conference paper, I showed that there is a contrast between two leading Thai thinkers on this problem. Phra Dhammapidok argues that human rights presuppose divisiveness and contentiousness, which then are not conducive to the ideal end of Buddhism. Social critic Sulak Sivaraksa, on the other hand, thinks the human rights are constitutive of the ideal end itself; thus Buddhism has much to offer to the struggle for greater awareness and actualization of the rights. In the paper I left the question open regarding who is right on this matter and did not discuss it, for that would require another paper in itself.
>However, in this position statement I would like to sketch a possible answer to the question. I think Theravaada Buddhism itself is neutral on this issue. That is, it neither affirms nor denies that the concept of human rights is inherent to it. Here I speak only of the Theravaada tradition, for that is the tradition in which I grow up and know better than any other. That Theravaada Buddhism is neutral on this does not mean that it is withdrawn or cut off from life outside the monastery. Far from it, the neutrality, in my view, makes possible an open space whereby debates and disagreements can occur on how best to accommodate people who are not enlightened, how best for almost all of us, who cannot get rid of egoistic tendencies, to live together.
>Moreover, the neutrality points to the *pragmatic* nature of Buddhism. In one of the Sutras, the Buddha told a story of a man suffering from an arrow. The immediate need for the man is to get rid of the arrow and treat the wound as soon as possible; but if the man or those around him insists on asking such questions as where the arrow came from, from what material it was made, and so on, the man himself might not be able to live long. These questions are irrelevant to the man's suffering, so are all philosophical speculations which detach people from making a direct effort to end their //dukkha.//
>So debates on whether there are human rights in Buddhism is comparable to the needless questions in the parable. What should be immediately attended to is that proper action take place, not just debates. This does not, however, necessarily mean that all philosophical discussions or debates are useless, in my view. But it accentuates the point that for Buddhism the only course is toward cessation ofsufferings, and if discussions and debates contribute to >that end, then they are valuable.
I would like to request a definition of "human rights" so that we all are on the same wavelength. I found when I lived in China, for example, that this idea differed from that used in the US. People tend to talk about it as though we all "know" what human rights are. As an example, where I lived in China, the right to personal safety was considered an essential huamn right and here in the US we don't talk about that. Thank you!
At 06:32 03/10/95 -0400, Kimberley Falk wrote:
>I would like to request a definition of "human rights" so that we all are on the same wavelength. I found when I lived in China, for example, that this idea differed from that used in the US. People tend to talk about it as though we all "know" what human rights are. As an example, where I lived in China, the right to personal safety was considered an essential huamn right and here in the US we don't talk about that. Thank you!
Kimberley - are you asking for a definition of human rights or a list of the particular rights which should go on a list of "human rights"?
If the former, I would say human rights are rights a person possesses by virtue of being human, in the sense that they are possessed by everyone regardless of race, colour, sex, religion, birth etc and are not conferred by--or removable by--a political or other authority.
As to what things should go on a list of human rights: things like life, liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of belief, equal treatment before the law, a right not to be tortured or persecuted, and a right to form political parties usually feature somewhere near the top. The UN Declaration goes further to mention a right to education and employment, and begins to sound a bit like a wish list or political manifesto than anything else. The Declaration seems to include personal safety (in some sense) in the right to "security of person" mentioned in article 3. If there are any activists out there, perhaps they could say what sort of rights they campaign for specifically.
Damien Keown
On Tue, 3 Oct 1995, Damien Keown wrote:
>At 06:32 03/10/95 -0400, Kimberley Falk wrote:
>>I would like to request a definition of "human rights" so that we all are on the same wavelength. I found when I lived in China, for example, that this idea differed from that used in the US. People tend to talk about it as though we all "know" what human rights are. As an example, where I lived in China, the right to personal safety was considered an essential huamn right and here in the US we don't talk about that. Thank you!
>Kimberley - are you asking for a definition of human rights or a list of the particular rights which should go on a list of "human rights"?
>If the former, I would say human rights are rights a person possesses by virtue of being human, in the sense that they are possessed by everyone regardless of race, colour, sex, religion, birth etc and are not conferred by--or removable by--a political or other authority.
>As to what things should go on a list of human rights: things like life, liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of belief, equal treatment before the law, a right not to be tortured or persecuted, and a right to form political parties usually feature somewhere near the top. The UN Declaration goes further to mention a right to education and employment, and begins to sound a bit like a wish list or political manifesto than anything else. The Declaration seems to include personal safety (in some sense) in the right to "security of person" mentioned in article 3. If there are any activists out there, perhaps they could say what sort of rights they campaign for specifically.
>Damien Keown
Dear Mr. Keown and All,
My point is that in order for us to share a discussion concerning rights [whether human or for sentient beings or even for social units such as family or nation], I believe that we need to establish some perhaps contested agreement on a definition of what we are talking about. Since coming back from China, I too often hear the buzz words, "human rights", which appear to be essentially the same as our US Bill of Rights, when in my experience from living other places where people think of their rights in different terms {in some cases meaning that the social unit takes precedence over the individual as strange as that may seem to many Americans}. When we are dealing with Buddhism, a philosophy and religion with worldwide roots in beliefs and traditions and practice, I feel that we need some foundation of common language and ground before we can deal with Buddhist ethics and rights.
For example, some of you have talked about organ transplantation and Buddhist ethics. In our evaluation of rights are we, for example, considering the rights of baboons in liver transplantation? What would their rights be in the context of Buddhist thought? If the retrieval of human organs for tranplantation is discouraged after death, wouldn't it also be so for animals? The reason I bring this up is that I feel the cultural contexts in which we define and evaluate these issues of rights shape both our questions and our answers in different ways. If we are all to accept the UN human rights guidelines as our standards -- and with its focus on individuals -- the ideas with which this conference will conclude about Buddhism and ethics will perhaps be very different than if we pursue definition of human and sentient beings rights from global and Buddhist perspectives. Since the voices of people involved in this net conference are international, we here have an opportunity to really move forward from the UN standard, which seems to me to be culturally fixed on a Western first world standard, toward perhaps sets of ideas about human rights and Buddhist ethics [meaning not a list of what they are necessarily, but rather at what levels individual/social unit/ or greater culture/society we are trying to consider]. This task indeed might be too much for one conference, but if that's the case, why not limit right at the start by clearly stating we will only deal with the rights of human individuals as clarified in the UN document on human rights? Then I and we will all know where we are heading with the perspective of the current discussions and conversations. Thank you very much, Kim
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... I would say human rights are rights a person possesses by virtue of being human, in the sense that they are possessed by everyone regardless of race, colour, sex, religion, birth etc and are not conferred by--or removable by--a political or other authority. [D. Keown] ----
Can there be such 'rights' in any meaningful (ie Buddhistic) sense? Could we have an example?
umm..
What is a 'right'? My dictionary can say only that it is what one is 'justly' or 'fairly' entitled to. It is thus a concept varying in meaning depending on current ideas of justice and fairness, and though we might feel we have the right to speak or act in certain ways, others may claim the right to disagree! A 'right' seems to be an essentially political concept used for political ends. Can it have any really spiritual purpose? The Buddha did not use the term. I have been told that in Indian languages the word for 'right' has come in only very recently, and that from Islamic sources. An individual Buddhist who claimed or insisted upon his right to have or do something would be entering a political arena, which could conceivably be skilful from an ethical point of view. However I would suggest that it is more Buddhistic to think in terms of one's duties and responsibilities. This was much more the Buddha's approach (cf Sigolavada Sutta etc. etc.) and is one that seems more conducive to spiritual development than a passive insistence on rights, useful though that may sometimes be in the ordinary political context.
>At 06:32 03/10/95 -0400, Kimberley Falk wrote:
>>I would like to request a definition of "human rights" so that we all are on the same wavelength. I found when I lived in China, for example, that this idea differed from that used in the US. People tend to talk about it as though we all "know" what human rights are. As an example, where I lived in China, the right to personal safety was considered an essential huamn right and here in the US we don't talk about that. Thank you!
>Kimberley - are you asking for a definition of human rights or a list of the particular rights which should go on a list of "human rights"?
>If the former, I would say human rights are rights a person possesses by virtue of being human, in the sense that they are possessed by everyone regardless of race, colour, sex, religion, birth etc and are not conferred by--or removable by--a political or other authority.
I would say that the concept of human rights without *human responsibilities* is weak. What I perceive is that the concept of human rights is a western concept, which is "imported" by eastern countries as a result of present-day circumstances.
In my opinion, such an explicit concept of human rights is hardly found in Buddhism. If you would remember, in some Jataka stories, the Boddhisatva himself sometimes made great sacrifices, either of himself or of his family members.
Therefore, I tend to see that "human rights" are something which is important, but may not necessarily be a central tenet in Buddhism. On the other hand, such rights are indeed to be accompanied by responsibilities. Buddhism always stresses the importance of good deeds to others. The five silas (PancaSila) is one example. Since everyone is both a subject and an object of good-deed, it means that everyone has both rights and responsibilities. Imposing one without the other could well mean chaos.
All in all, I think that both human rights and human responsibilities are important, and that they form the "infra-structure" of the Buddhistic goal of life, i.e. the final liberation (Nirvana).
As a question, I wonder, whether there is any "balance" between "human rights" and "human responsibilities" in Buddhism? And if yes, how "balanced"??
(Kimberley C. Falk) -Reply
** Reply Requested When Convenient **
Kimberley - are you asking for a definition of human rights or a list of the particular rights which should go on a list of "human rights"?
If the former, I would say human rights are rights a person possesses by virtue of being human, in the sense that they are possessed by everyone regardless of race, colour, sex, religion, birth etc and are not conferred by--or removable by--a political or other authority.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
But this is precisely the problem: If these are not bestowed by a political authority, then where *do* they come from? The use by rights activists of terms like "inalienable" makes it clear that the fundamental thinking is essentialist: this is not a historical or social happenstance, but somehow an essential part of the phenomenon that is the human being. And here is where we can see the spectre of atman-thinking creeping back into Buddhism.
DM> As to what things should go on a list of human rights: things like life, liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of belief, equal treatment before the law, a right not to be tortured or persecuted, and a right to form political parties usually feature somewhere near the top.
I think we can all agree that these are GOOD THINGS. That is not the issue. The issue is whether the importation of rights terminology into B'ism does not violate the latter's insights into the human condition, ie radical interdependence and non-essentialism. And if it does, what kind of terminology B'ists could use that would be consonant with the *goals* of human rights without compromising the B'ist uncompromising stance on nonsubstantiality. <<<<<<<<<<
Since I am limited to only about an hour each day on the Internet, I have to prepare my post off-line. Reading the new posts, I feel that my contribution here might not be directly in the thick of things. But, anyway, here it is. I feel very much like to respond to many of the excellent posts directly, but for now at least I can't do that. So please bear with me if my posts or responses are a little late. I would appreciate it a lot if any of the conference participants comment or criticize what I have to say here. This has been brewing in my mind for some time, and this conference is a perfect opportunity to air this view. Thanks.
Soraj Hongladarom
Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts
Chulalongkorn University
Bangkok 10330, THAILAND
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Clarifying my position
In my position statement I said that Theravaada Buddhism is neutral regarding the question of founding human rights within its system. This does not mean, however, that I am saying that Theravaada Buddhism is unconcerned or ignorant of the actualization or enforcement of the rights. But what I am proposing is that Buddhism is very clear and specific on what the ultimate goal of humans is and how they could go about attaining it, and the one who sets himself or herself toward the goal is not progressing toward it if he or she becomes engaged in 'academic' questions without realizing that they could only be means, to be discarded once their usefulness is exhausted or their true nature is fully grasped. The pragmatic nature of Buddhism teaches that philosophical argumentation and questionings are only valuable if they help those pursuing them realizing the Path; these activities are not ends in themselves. However, questions regarding the nature or the foundation of human rights, while important in their own right, do not directly promote the path to the ultimate goal, if their pursuit comes in form of contentions and endless debates. The Buddha, I think, is clear on this. One does not attain the goal if one is always engaged in such contentions and philosophical pursuit.
This is the reason why I think Buddhism is neutral on the problem of grounding human rights. I would venture to say that the Buddhist position I am interpreting here is largely similar to that of a pragmatist.
The grounding problem is by nature an epistemological one, and the typical pragmatist attitude toward this kind of problem is that the whole idea of grounding is suspect. Philosophical problems such as this do not lend themselves to easy and neatly defined answers precisely because they are not capable to. Dialectic is built into the nature of such philosphical activity. What this implies for our question at hand is that the Buddhist, as well as the pragmatist, sees the grounding problem as an exercise, the activity of searching for the answer itself being a means toward an end. What is crucial is not which position is the right one, but that engaging in such activity as searching for the 'right' answer through debate and discussion--which could well go on and on, limited only by external circumstances--is valuable if it serves some purpose. For Buddhism that purpose is that, eventually, the ideal end itself is achieved.
This has become a bit too theoretical. What I am proposing, in short, is that Buddhism is analogous to an open arena where opponents in debates can participate in their games. The image of Tibetan monks intensely debating the fine points in the texts comes to mind.
Buddhism is equally at home with both with absolute monarchy and with egalitarian democracy. Asoka was a powerful autocrat, albeit a relatively benevolent one, and one can easily imagine a state which is genuinely democratic whose citizens are predominantly Buddhist (not just nominally, but really practicing ones). What this shows, in my view, is that Buddhism does not actually care for what kind of government is in place, so long as the populace are satisfied, the state stable,and the Sangha community is well cared for.
If human rights are inherent in Buddhism, then it should have had conflicts with autocratic, absolute monarchical regimes, but history seems to show that Buddhism prospered tremendously during monarchical regimes.
Due to limited time I can only cite textual support from memory. In my position statement I cited the arrow parable. Another story coming from the Suutras is that once the Buddha was staying with his disciples in a forest. He picked up some of the leaves which had fallen around him in his hand and asked the monks which ones were larger in number--the leaves in his hand or the ones in the whole forest. The monks answered that the latter were larger. The Buddha then said that all the knowledges that were known by him were as numerous as the leaves in the forest, but he did not teach them because they were not conducive to cessation of suffering. He only taught those knowledges which were conducive to cessation of suffering, which were fewer in number.
I interpret this Suutra as saying that such philosophical questions as the grounding of human rights are comparable to the leaves in the forest the Buddha prefers not to talk about. The immediate task is to attain cessation of suffering. This saying of the Buddha has been vexing me for a long, long time. For, as has been acknowledged by many in this conference, human rights at least are not incompatible with the Buddha's teachings, and the ideal Buddhist community is surely one where the *purpose* of having the rights is clearly actualized. Perhaps a way out is to take it that talks of rights are still necessary for us imperfect beings who are still attached to egoistic tendencies. In this type of situation talks of rights, I agree, are necessary and important. But as for the question whether such talks are 'grounded' in Buddhism, that's another matter.
At 04:41 04/10/95 EDT, Anthony Matthews wrote:
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>... I would say human rights are rights a person possesses by virtue of being human, in the sense that they are possessed by everyone regardless of race, colour, sex, religion, birth etc and are not conferred by--or removable by--a political or other authority. [D. Keown] ----
>Can there be such 'rights' in any meaningful (ie Buddhistic) sense? Could we have an example?
Many examples have been given. The right to life is a fundamental one. Freedom to practise one's religion is another.
>umm..
>What is a 'right'? My dictionary can say only that it is what one is 'justly' or
>'fairly' entitled to. It is thus a concept varying in meaning depending on
current ideas of justice and fairness, and though we might feel we have the right to speak or act in certain ways, others may claim the right to disagree!
The concept itself doesn't vary in meaning -- what happens is that people disagree about who has rights to what, and the claims have to be examined to see who is correct.
>A 'right' seems to be an essentially political concept used for political ends.
"Human" rights are primarily moral claims, although they are commonly enshrined in and given effect through political instruments. Their ultimate authority is a moral rather than a political one.
>. However I would suggest that it is more Buddhistic to think in terms of one's duties and responsibilities. This was much
>more the Buddha's approach (cf Sigolavada Sutta etc. etc.) and is one that seems
>more conducive to spiritual development than a passive insistence on rights, useful though that may sometimes be in the ordinary political context.
Like Buddhism, Christianity traditionally used the language of duties and responsibilities, but now talks in terms of rights as well. Christians haven't changed their beliefs, they just find the new vocabulary more appropriate in certain contexts. There is no real distinction between the moral and political spheres in this context: human rights are a means of giving legal/political effect to what is "right" on moral grounds.
Damien Keown