Re: Rights and Precepts
>Damien Keown wrote:
>>Peter Harvey wrote:
>>It does not seem necessary to go as far as Sulak Sivaraksa does, though, when he says that human rights are constitutive of the Buddhist ideal. The ideal goes beyond talk of rights, but talk of rights helps to protect people in their process of moving towards the ideal.
>If I could just add a comment to this, I think both positions are compatible in the sense that rights BOTH help people move towards the ideal AND are constitutive of the ideal. The Buddha respected the rights of others (for example, by his observance of the precepts he refrained from doing them any injustice, which is basically what rights seek to secure), and since he represents the ideal in Buddhism, then respecting rights is part of the ideal. <<...>
There is a logical lapse in this argument. The historic buddha was male. Would you also say that maleness is part of the buddhist ideal? He was said to be very handsome. Would you say that handsomeness is part of the buddhist ideal? The key is that the ideal is manifested IN the Buddha. The ideal is not EQUIVALENT to the Buddha.
>Peter added:
>>b) Is talk of human rights part of the Buddhist ideal?
>>I would also say : no, though a spontaneous respect for other humans (without needing to talk of 'human rights') would be.
>I think we are probably in agreement on this -- whether we use the terminology of "rights" or "human rights" is not in the end important, so long as we treat others with respect.
>Damien Keown
Words DO make a difference. They each have their histories and connotations. Usage of a word brings up a whole web of related ideas and attitudes. Many(most?) participants see rights as claims against governments to protect/ benefit the individuals. This clearly puts it in the realm of politics. Respect for one another is clearly in the realm of interpersonal relationships. It seems to me the most one can say is that Rights Talk is one way to express respects for human beings in the political realm.
-------------------
>The purpose of rights isn't to command reality to obey our whims (to regard rights in this way--which I accept many people do--is an abuse of the idea). Rights are claims made on other rational agents to do what justice requires (treat others fairly). I think this is not really so different from asking people to respect the precepts (e.g. not to kill me is to respect my right to life) something which Buddhism certainly calls on everyone to do. Since Buddhism makes this universal appeal through its precepts, it seems to be calling for universal respect for basic rights. Its teachings are thus in harmony with modern human rights manifestos.
>Damien Keown
Precepts are voluntary standards of conduct and thought one adopts for oneself. Rights are claims or demands on the conducts of others. Precepts are guidelines in the context of the Sangha and lay community of practitioners to futher one's way toward full realization of buddhahood. Rights are guideline to help unenlightened beings to minimize sufferings in a community. Precepts and Rights may be complementary, but hardly equivalent.
I do not understand why people are dissatisfied with Rights as skillful means. Medecine, engineering, and democratic institutions are ALL skillful means. They are all immensely beneficial to human kinds, but they do not have the power in themselves to bring forth enlightenment. Same with promoting Rights and doing charitable works.
I would like to highlight a subtext of the current discussion:
What is the appropriate degree or ways for buddhists to engage in politcal works?
This is perhaps too big a topic to cover in this conference. However, I cannot see how one can avoid this question while trying to analyze the relation between Buddhism and Human Rights.
Regards,
A. Chu
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"A. Chu" writes:
: Precepts are voluntary standards of conduct and thought one adopts for onesel
: f.
: Rights are claims or demands on the conducts of others.
: Precepts are guidelines in the context of the Sangha and lay community of
: practitioners to futher one's way toward full realization of buddhahood.
: Rights are guideline to help unenlightened beings to minimize sufferings
: in a community.
: Precepts and Rights may be complementary, but hardly equivalent.
:
: I do not understand why people are dissatisfied with Rights as skillful means
: .
: Medecine, engineering, and democratic institutions are ALL skillful means.
: They are all immensely beneficial to human kinds, but they do not have the
: power in themselves to bring forth enlightenment. Same with promoting Rights
: and doing charitable works.
:
: I would like to highlight a subtext of the current discussion:
:
: What is the appropriate degree or ways for buddhists to engage in politcal
: works?
:
: This is perhaps too big a topic to cover in this conference. However,
: I cannot see how one can avoid this question while trying to analyze the
: relation between Buddhism and Human Rights.
It seems to me that at last we are coming to an important issue. Which could perhaps be rephrased as asking:
What actions should Buddhists take to create a polity and economy that is supportive of the Buddhadharma?
---
Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH
Internet: junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu
At 13:29 04/10/95 -0400, A. Chu wrote:
>>Damien Keown wrote:
>>If I could just add a comment to this, I think both positions are compatible in the sense that rights BOTH help people move towards the ideal AND are constitutive of the ideal. The Buddha respected the rights of others (for example, by his observance of the precepts he refrained from doing them any injustice, which is basically what rights seek to secure), and since he represents the ideal in Buddhism, then respecting rights is part of the ideal. <<<...>
>There is a logical lapse in this argument. The historic buddha was male. Would you also say that maleness is part of the buddhist ideal? He was said to be very handsome. Would you say that handsomeness is part of the buddhist ideal? The key is that the ideal is manifested IN the Buddha. The ideal is not EQUIVALENT to the Buddha.
The Buddha's physical appearance and gender have no bearing on ethics. The point is that Buddhists regard him as a moral exemplar with respect to his conduct. If Buddhists take their cue from the Buddha (and where else would they take it from) they should respect the rights of others.
>>I think we are probably in agreement on this -- whether we use the terminology of "rights" or "human rights" is not in the end important, so long as we treat others with respect.
>>Damien Keown
>Words DO make a difference. They each have their histories and connotations. Usage of a word brings up a whole web of related ideas and attitudes. Many(most?) participants see rights as claims against governments to protect/ benefit the individuals. This clearly puts it in the realm of politics. Respect for one another is clearly in the realm of interpersonal relationships. It seems to me the most one can say is that Rights Talk is one way to express respects for human beings in the political realm.
Human rights are fundamentally moral rights. They can be given legal effect (which is what human rights activists call for) and be exerted against governments. Why is this a problem?
>Precepts are voluntary standards of conduct and thought one adopts for oneself.
The precepts are duties which apply whether you voluntarily adopt them or not.
>I do not understand why people are dissatisfied with Rights as skillful means.
To regard human rights in this way is to strip them of any real foundation. Totalitarian regimes would be very happy with a concept of human rights as something provisional which could be suspended if "skilful means" demanded it for some more pressing reason.
>I would like to highlight a subtext of the current discussion:
>What is the appropriate degree or ways for buddhists to engage in politcal works?
This is the subject for the second week of the conference.
Damien Keown
A. Chu wrote:
>I do not understand why people are dissatisfied with Rights as skillful means. Medecine, engineering, and democratic institutions are ALL skillful means. They are all immensely beneficial to human kinds, but they do not have the power in themselves to bring forth enlightenment. Same with promoting Rights and doing charitable works.
>I would like to highlight a subtext of the current discussion:
>What is the appropriate degree or ways for buddhists to engage in politcal
>works?
How about regarding politics also as skillful means, and adhering to its root meaning (in the singular, at least)?
pol'i tic, adj.
1. Using or marked by prudence, expedience, and shrewdness; artful. 2. Using, displaying, or proceeding from policy; judicious: a politic decision. 3. Crafty; cunning. [from Greek politikos, from politTs, citizen, from polis, city. ]
--------------
Adjective: Showing sensitivity and skill in dealing with others. sensitive, diplomatic, delicate, discreet, tactful.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Sally Clay, Zangmo Blue Thundercloud
*** Northampton, Mass.
"Where the coffee is strong and so are the women."
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
To A Chu
I concur with your comments. Craig Ihara
Peter Junger contributed the following:
>It seems to me that at last we are coming to an important issue. Which could perhaps be rephrased as asking:
>What actions should Buddhists take to create a polity and economy that is supportive of the Buddhadharma?
It seems to me the first step buddhists must take lies in the question Shin'ya Kasugai required answered as part of entrance to Bukkyo Daigaku graduate programs: what is the buddhism beyond the buddhisms?
Kasugai was a Jodo scholar who had spent lots of time in India, spoke several tibetan dialects, and had a remarkable life of scholarship and pilgrimage. His question, as a good Kyoto thinker/doer, asked to focus on an emergent global sense of buddhism - as it outgrew being Japanese Buddhisms, Tibetan Buddhisms, etc.
We're importing virtually every kind of Buddhism still holding spiritual importance. But dangers surround us. In the United States, a powerful and growing backlash to this century aims at establishment of a Christian theocracy. Little by little it erodes liberal institutions rooted in the spiritual vision of America's founding fathers. Asian spirituality, Buddhism in particular, is a target for removal. One need only watch the disinformation campaign at work in Pat Robertson's news broadcasts when they feature Buddhist subjects to get the point. So, Peter's question is intensely practical.
First, the art of our personal lives and family lives is the theatre of putting buddhadharma in action. After all, the intent of the shilas is quality of relationship. If our lives and families are not attempts at establishing minisanghas, what hope have we?
The first paramita is dana, giving. Shikshadana is upheld as a virtue - giving of education. Dharma centers and monto have traditionally been known as educational centers. Not for creating little private country clubs that abuse dharma as an escape and avoidance of life, but as practical centers of liberating education and strategic agenda planning. For example, it's nice to know about dependent origination and samsara; how can we deconstruct the use of television for mind control (advertising), stable reality construction (political campaigns and news), and other in-forming (namarupa) activities to shape and imprison consciousness? Application and understanding of buddhist values affective of supporting human and life rights depends on transforming practice and education the liberates enslavement to free people. In turn, the whole issue of rights depends on a free spirited people.
Buddhism does not exist outside development of communities we know as sanghas (except from pratyekabuddhas - the metaphysical "special case" wanker class). In the West, Sangha is growing out of the limiting sense of monastics, since most of us are not monastic. So, how we raise children together, care for the elderly together, treat one another, and move together to place our values into decision making in business, politics, voting, and other common activities can become quite powerful. I personally feel that as the economic crunch, unemployment, homelessness, etc grows, sanghas ought to be creative incubator centers for new service industries and artisan communities, food buying clubs, etc, paving alternative economic growth - all embodying and teaching us to embody the high principle we say we'd like to live up to!!!
Gassho,
Ken O'Neill, Kyoshi
White Lotus Society
Tucson, Arizona
>A. Chu wrote:
>>I do not understand why people are dissatisfied with Rights as skillful means. Medecine, engineering, and democratic institutions are ALL skillful means. They are all immensely beneficial to human kinds, but they do not have the power in themselves to bring forth enlightenment. Same with promoting Rights and doing charitable works.
>>I would like to highlight a subtext of the current discussion:
>>What is the appropriate degree or ways for buddhists to engage in
ppolitcal
>>works?
Sally Clay cleverly responded:
>How about regarding politics also as skillful means, and adhering to its root meaning (in the singular, at least)?
>pol'i tic, adj.
>1. Using or marked by prudence, expedience, and shrewdness; artful. 2. Using, displaying, or proceeding from policy; judicious: a politic decision.
>3. Crafty; cunning. [from Greek politikos, from politTs, citizen, from polis, city. ]
>--------------
>Adjective: Showing sensitivity and skill in dealing with others.
ssensitive, diplomatic, delicate, discreet, tactful.
Hang on for this one. Upaya originally meant deceipt, and was a political term. Upaya or skill in means is deceipt elevated to a spiritual art rooted in wisdom/emptiness//compassion/awakened passion. Take the famous metaphor of the Lotus Sutra as guiding light. A father returns home from the market only to find his house on fire, wife and kids inside. Does he yell "fire". No, He'll either panic them, or more likely, they'll ignore him. In full passionate deceipt, he yells out (not too loudly either, because compassion works with greed) - hey everybody, come see the presents and gifts I bought for you." They come out immediately.
One reason I love the mahayana sutras so is that the clever ones are filled with examples of passionately awakened deceipt - skill in means. Time and time again they pull the carpet from beneath us, unsticking us in our ways. Take the Kegon Sutra; only the lowest bodhisattvas are monks; all the rest are laywomen, lay men, and ten goddesses. All manifestations of coyote, tricksters through and through.
Once we unimprison buddhism from the avidya that it's a respectable Eastern religion, we can start getting to its core. Take Vimalakirti - playing sick on us, the buddha sending reluctant monks and bodhisattvas to this old layman, only for him to wake them up. The metaphor is clear: politics and skill in communication arts drives real buddhist activity. Droning capsulated philosophy and theology at the ears of listeners, all packaged in everlasting formulas and canned talks miserably fails as powerful, transforming communication.
Bodhisattvas live for personal and social transformation. All come to realize in their innermost heart their job is to establish buddharealms - to wake thier portion of this world. And to become artists of deceipt in order to get the real work done.
Gassho,
Ken O'Neill, Kyoshi
White Lotus Society
Tucson, Arizona
At 12:40 AM 10/5/95 +0100, Damien Keown wrote:
>>I do not understand why people are dissatisfied with Rights as skillful means.
>To regard human rights in this way is to strip them of any real foundation. Totalitarian regimes would be very happy with a concept of human rights as something provisional which could be suspended if "skilful means" demanded it for some more pressing reason.
Yes, they have to be skillful means to a well stated end. The end point must be visible, and the means must always be stated in terms of this end. The skillful means must be protected from being subverted to a lesser end.
I think Buddhism should take the stance that "Rights" are the current common coin. The Buddhist goal is compatible with this coin, and therefore Buddhists are doing business in this coin. But Buddhism is not about this coin, and Buddhism will abandon this coin immediately if it becomes devalued.
-----
Sphere.
:Message-Id: <9510052350.AA16758@intfw.bear.com> :Date: Thu, 5 Oct 1995 00:40:02 +0100
:From: Damien Keown
:At 13:29 04/10/95 -0400, A. Chu wrote:
:>>Damien Keown wrote:
:
:The Buddha's physical appearance and gender have no bearing on ethics. The
:point is that Buddhists regard him as a moral exemplar with respect to his
:conduct. If Buddhists take their cue from the Buddha (and where else would
:they take it from) they should respect the rights of others.
We might all agree that he respected others. To say that he 'respected the //rights// of others' is casting a specific interpretation.
:>>I think we are probably in agreement on this -- whether we use the
:>>terminology of "rights" or "human rights" is not in the end important, so
:>>long as we treat others with respect.
:>
:>>Damien Keown
:>
:>Words DO make a difference. They each have their histories and connotations.
:>Usage of a word brings up a whole web of related ideas and attitudes.
:>Many(most?) participants see rights as claims against governments to protect/
:>benefit the individuals. This clearly puts it in the realm of politics.
:>Respect for one another is clearly in the realm of interpersonal relationships.
:>It seems to me the most one can say is that Rights Talk is one way to express
:>respects for human beings in the political realm.
:Human rights are fundamentally moral rights. They can be given legal effect
:(which is what human rights activists call for) and be exerted against
:governments. Why is this a problem?
I have no problem with buddhists participating fully in the realms of law or ethics or politics. I do feel that we need to be clear about the type of discourse we are engaging in. Rights Talk are in the realm of law, but more so in the realm of politics, IMHO. Even within the context of 'rule of law' and effective law enforcement, political actions may still be necessary to assert particular rights: the case of the ERA in the US comes to mind. However, in the absence of a world goverment with police power, human rights advocates must rely upon moral suasions and political influences to modify the behavior of another government. ( I assume that no one in this forum would advocate the use of military force to assert rights. But perhaps a good case can be made for Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia... Topics for the second weeks, I think. )
:>Precepts are voluntary standards of conduct and thought one adopts for oneself.
:The precepts are duties which apply whether you voluntarily adopt them or not.
Perhaps we are thinking of different terms. Surely you would not say that the Precept of 'not eating pass noon' is a duty applicable to an Hindu?
:>I do not understand why people are dissatisfied with Rights as skillful means.
:To regard human rights in this way is to strip them of any real foundation.
:Totalitarian regimes would be very happy with a concept of human rights as
:something provisional which could be suspended if "skilful means" demanded
:it for some more pressing reason.
Many advocates of Human Rights as universal and fundamental appear to be searching for an absolute and transcendent ethical standpoint from which to make judgements. I harbor doubts as to whether this approach resonates well with buddhist approaches to resolving conflicts and reducing sufferings.
Regards,
A. Chu
--
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Bear Stearns is not responsible for any recommendation, solicitation, offer or
agreement or any information about any transaction, customer account or account
activity contained in this communication.
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At 17:53 06/10/95 -0400, A. Chu wrote:
>We might all agree that he respected others. To say that he 'respected the //rights// of others' is casting a specific interpretation.
Yes, indeed. It's offering an analytical account of his behaviour to show (I hope!) that his conduct is intelligible in terms of -- and perfectly consistent with -- the concept of rights. I am suggesting that the Buddha's conduct can be explained quite intelligibly by reference to the concept of rights, and that if this is correct there is no bar to Buddhists today making use of the concept to promote the cause of human rights.
>I have no problem with buddhists participating fully in the realms of law or ethics or politics. I do feel that we need to be clear about the type of discourse we are engaging in. Rights Talk are in the realm of law, but more so in the realm of politics, IMHO.
The discourse of rights crosses many disciplinary boundaries including morals, law and politics. The law comes in to enforce what we believe to be morally right (this oversimplifies things, but I think it holds in the case of human rights at least). In other words, we want the law to enforce human rights because we believe them to be just and fair.
Example: the First Precept prohibits murder, and most countries have a law prohibiting homicide. Yes, we can say one is the realm of morals, the other is the realm of law, but why is the fact that the law intrudes problematic? Laws are a requirement of social life -- we need legal sanctions because not everyone acts morally of their own volition.
Politicians may also become involved, for example by asking other countries not to torture political prisoners. The various "realms" may thus overlap, but doesn't Buddhism tell us that everything is interdependent? Buddhism in the modern world has to deal with all of these levels - moral, legal, and political, since they are inextricably linked. HHDL seems to be setting a good example in this respect.
>Even within the context of
>'rule of law' and effective law enforcement, political actions may still be necessary to assert particular rights: the case of the ERA in the US comes to mind. However, in the absence of a world goverment with police power, human rights advocates must rely upon moral suasions and political influences to modify the behavior of another government.
Agreed. Some do not like the idea of Buddhism becoming involved in law and politics, and I can understand their reasons. However, I think Buddhism has to address these issues and take a stand if it is to be a force for good in the modern world.
>( I assume that
>no one in this forum would advocate the use of military force to assert rights. But perhaps a good case can be made for Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia... Topics for the second weeks, I think. )
Good question. I think a case could be made out for the use of military force -- let's see if it comes up next week!
>:The precepts are duties which apply whether you voluntarily adopt them or not.
>Perhaps we are thinking of different terms. Surely you would not say that the Precept of 'not eating pass noon' is a duty applicable to an Hindu?
This is a monastic precept, binding only on those who take monastic vows. However, I think most people would agree there are basic obligations we all have to one another as human beings regardless of whether we are Hindus, Christians or Buddhists -- for example to respect each other's human rights. If we are to have human rights at all, those obligations must be present whether we have voluntarily adopted them or not. If they were purely voluntary we could just say "Sorry, I haven't adopted them so they don't apply to me" and carry on torturing.
>Many advocates of Human Rights as universal and fundamental appear to be searching for an absolute and transcendent ethical standpoint from which to make judgements. I harbor doubts as to whether this approach resonates well with buddhist approaches to resolving conflicts and reducing sufferings.
It is hard to see how there can be universal human rights unless we have some absolute ethical standard to base our judgements on. Compassion, dependent-origination, and human dignity have all been proposed in this conference as providing such a foundation. I accept that speaking in these terms does not sit well with some interpretations of Buddhism and at least on the surface with certain doctrines. On the other hand, Buddhist teachings do proclaim universal truths about the world, human nature, and its ultimate destiny. The Dharma is unchanging, and includes moral teachings, as in the Fourth Noble Truth. There are thus good grounds for saying that Buddhism teaches there are universal moral standards.
Buddhists who reject this idea, however, must then either i) explain how they ground their belief in universal human rights in the absence of such standards, or ii) reject the idea of human rights as incompatible with Buddhism. Anyone who adopts ii), however, would have dubious grounds for objecting to Chinese labour camps in Tibet and the examples of human rights abuses against women of the kind mentioned by Hilary Clinton in her speech.
Cheers,
Damien Keown
At 06:37 AM 10/8/95 EDT, Damien Keown wrote:
....There are thus good grounds for saying that Buddhism teaches there are universal moral standards.
>Buddhists who reject this idea, however, must then either i) explain how they ground their belief in universal human rights in the absence of such standards, or ii) reject the idea of human rights as incompatible with Buddhism. Anyone who
>adopts ii), however, would have dubious grounds for objecting to Chinese labour camps in Tibet and the examples of human rights abuses against women of the kind mentioned by Hilary Clinton in her speech.
Your assertion of either i) or ii) seems rooted in western logical formalisms, and incompatible with dependent co-arising. The notions of "human rights" seem to me to be perfectly good mental fictions. Objects which do not exactly capture the essence, yet do capture some aspect of it in a usable manner.
Thus, I can easily claim that there are no universal moral standards, but human rights are a useful mechanism for helping achieve a goal. In particular, I think that each human right might capture some point within a particular loop of causes of suffering. In doing so this right is in no way fundamental or universal, yet by asserting the right the loop of causation may be broken -- and suffering reduced.
For example, if the right not to be killed is asserted then we step into the loop of retribution -- if you do not kill me then my friends will have less desire to kill you.
I think the danger in rights is that they become attachments. And I therefore think that the challenge for Buddhism is to make effective use of the notions of rights without allowing attachment to these notions.
-----
Sphere.
On Sun, 8 Oct 1995, williams wrote:
>At 06:37 AM 10/8/95 EDT, Damien Keown wrote:
.....There are thus good grounds for saying that Buddhism teaches there are universal moral standards.
>>Buddhists who reject this idea, however, must then either i) explain how they
>>ground their belief in universal human rights in the absence of such standards,
>>or ii) reject the idea of human rights as incompatible with Buddhism.
AAnyone who
>>adopts ii), however, would have dubious grounds for objecting to Chinese labour
>>camps in Tibet and the examples of human rights abuses against women of the kind mentioned by Hilary Clinton in her speech.
>Your assertion of either i) or ii) seems rooted in western logical formalisms, and incompatible with dependent co-arising. The notions of "human rights" seem to me to be perfectly good mental fictions. Objects which do not exactly capture the essence, yet do capture some aspect of it in a usable manner.
>Thus, I can easily claim that there are no universal moral standards, but human rights are a useful mechanism for helping achieve a goal. In particular, I think that each human right might capture some point within a particular loop of causes of suffering. In doing so this right is in no way fundamental or universal, yet by asserting the right the loop of causation may be broken -- and suffering reduced.
>For example, if the right not to be killed is asserted then we step into the loop of retribution -- if you do not kill me then my friends will have less desire to kill you.
>I think the danger in rights is that they become attachments. And I therefore think that the challenge for Buddhism is to make effective use of the notions of rights without allowing attachment to these notions.
>-----
>Sphere.
Following this argument further, I would ask that we also not become attached to any one government being positioned as the enemy. It offends me greatly to read blasts against the PRC as though they work only for evil and against people. I am not their apologist, but I am neither willing to stand by silently as they are constantly positioned as the enemy. I lived there in that land, and not all of their people feel and think the way some of you do. That does not stem from ignorance, but from alternative views. An attachment to thinking of others as evil inhibits our understanding and listening to them. We would first do better to look at ourselves and our own cultures; to try to then listen and understand and through dialogues formed through trust work toward our goals. Most people in the Chinese government now fully see the lack of trust and inability of others to see beyond their own perspectives. How can they ever understand others' positions on Tibet when outsiders do not earnestly hear / listen? This needs to come from all sides of debate; and all sides need to contemplate their own motivations. I am willing to accept and acknowledge that there have been terrible abuses in Tibet and elsewhere, which is morally wrong in my view, but I am also willing to try to understand and listen to what they have to say about it.
This offends me so much to hear China being positioned in this negative light, because in China more than anywhere I have ever lived I found 90 % of the people held a powerful commitment to sharing and caring for each other (huxiang bang mang). Their approach to dealing with others was one of interconnectedness and interbeing that stems from a historical tradition (some rural people say this is throughout Chinese history, others say it stems from Mao) of watching out and caring for others. Can you imagine my shock to overhear people talking causally with each other about having fewer children for the sake of their villages' or their counties' development? [And for you skeptics, no, it was not just done for my benefit.] Can you imagine a breastfeeding mother riding her bicycle 10 miles to visit me in the hospital, looking for me for four hours, riding back to the village to breastfeed her baby because it was time, then another 10 miles again to find me to make sure I was cared for? These are not isolated stories, folks. It took me a long time to understand that people were asking me how I was, what I was doing, etc., not to report to Public Security or to watch my movements but to show that they cared for me. Their caring was in part because the idea of the importance of the individual is different than in the US. Individuals are instead viewed in terms of their relationships to others (as friends, families, fellow villagers, neighbors). Taking care of others is taking care of your self and your own.
The gulf in lack of understanding of the Chinese, their government and culture is vast here in the West. Even among the Buddhist communities there is not universal agreement there in China, although I do not feel qualified to represent their views here in this venue. My priest in Beijing would say that we must listen and be compassionate. Before there can be discussion, there must be listening and contemplation. Understanding will slowly follow.
I hear that many of you writing and reading here feel strongly pro-Tibet, and I respect that. I too have read the Amnesty International and Snow Lion accounts, and follow the Chinese news closely. But I say to you, that you will never get farther than your own anger and fear if you set up for a war in your minds.
Thanks for reading. I look forward to hearing from you... -- Kim
>>>Damien Keown <100012.3212@compuserve.com> 8/10/95, 12:37pm >>>
>It is hard to see how there can be universal human rights unless we have some absolute ethical standard to base our judgements on.
^^^^^^^^
Precisely. Now let's see how that went again?
"Samma sankharaa anicca"
If *everything* is impermanent, in what sense is it absolute? I remain unconvinced that HR is consonant with core Buddhist teachings except as an upaya. The metaphysics simply don't match up.
Michel Clasquin
Damien Keown wrote:
'It is hard to see how there can be universal human rights unless we have some absolute ethical stadard to base our judgements on'.
Michael Clasquin, replied:
'... If *everything* is impermanent, in what sense is it absolute? I remain uncovinced that HR is consonant with core Buddhist teachings except as an upaya. The metaphysics simply don't add up'.
Is it the case that 'all conditioned things are impermanent' applies to //principles// as well as mental and physical states/events? Is the principle 'all conditioned things are impermanent' 'impermanent'? There is a passage somewhere which says, 'whether Tathaagatas arise or not, it remains true that... "all conditioned things are impermanent"'. Is the principle 'the compassionate Bodhisattva should seek to save all (empty) beings' 'impermanent'? Arguably, the only thing 'impermanent' about human rights is:
i) whether they are respected in a particular time and place, or even codified in law at a particular time and place. ii) the precise items specified by that agreed code of human rights (given that fundamental rights might be cashed out through different instrumentasl ones, according to social conditions). ii) whether the precise language of 'human rights' is used.
But others may disagree!
Peter Harvey
Michel Clasquin wrote:
-------- start quote --------
>>>Damien Keown <100012.3212@compuserve.com> 8/10/95, 12:37pm >>>
>It is hard to see how there can be universal human rights unless we have some absolute ethical standard to base our judgements on.
^^^^^^^^
Precisely. Now let's see how that went again?
"Samma sankharaa anicca"
If *everything* is impermanent, in what sense is it absolute? I remain unconvinced that HR is consonant with core Buddhist teachings except as an upaya. The metaphysics simply don't match up. -------- end quote --------
Perhaps "fixed ethical standard determined by the consent of citizens" might be a more usable standard than "absolute"?
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Sally Clay, Zangmo Blue Thundercloud
*** Northampton, Mass. "Where the coffee is strong and so are the women."
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At 04:02 PM 10/9/95 +0100, peter.harvey wrote:
>Is it the case that 'all conditioned things are impermanent' applies to //principles// as well as mental and physical states/events? Is the
Yes.
>principle 'all conditioned things are impermanent' 'impermanent'? There
Yes.
>is a passage somewhere which says, 'whether Tathaagatas arise or not, it remains true that... "all conditioned things are impermanent"'. Is the principle 'the compassionate Bodhisattva should seek to save all (empty) beings' 'impermanent'?
Yes.
>Arguably, the only thing 'impermanent' about human rights is:
>i) whether they are respected in a particular time and place, or even codified in law at a particular time and place. ii) the precise items specified by that agreed code of human rights (given that fundamental rights might be cashed out through different instrumentasl ones, according to social conditions). ii) whether the precise language of 'human rights' is used.
>But others may disagree!
Yes.
-----
Sphere.
:Message-Id: <9510081325.AA08282@intfw.bear.com> :Date: Sun, 8 Oct 1995 06:37:14 EDT
:From: Damien Keown <100012.3212@compuserve.com>
:At 17:53 06/10/95 -0400, A. Chu wrote:
<..>
:>Even within the context of
:>'rule of law' and effective law enforcement, political actions may
:>still be necessary to assert particular rights: the case of the ERA in the US
:>comes to mind. However, in the absence of a world goverment with police
:>power, human rights advocates must rely upon moral suasions and political
:>influences to modify the behavior of another government.)
:Agreed. Some do not like the idea of Buddhism becoming involved in law and
:politics, and I can understand their reasons. However, I think Buddhism has to
:address these issues and take a stand if it is to be a force for good in the
:modern world.
I'd agree that buddhists SHOULD take stands for what they believe in. However, the reason I stress the separation of the realms of discourse is that I have different degrees of condfidences on how well my actions accord with Dharma. In the ethical realm, restricted negative rights can live comfortably with buddhist approaches, IMO. In the legal realm, I would have less confidence as we are depending on imperfect laws enforced by probably unenlightened people. In the political realm, I'd have even less confidences in my stands as there are few other realms so awashed with ego, fear, and greed (perhaps in commerce?).
<..>
:>Perhaps we are thinking of different terms. Surely you would not say :>that the Precept of 'not eating pass noon' is a duty applicable to an Hindu?
:This is a monastic precept, binding only on those who take monastic vows.
:However, I think most people would agree there are basic obligations we all have
:to one another as human beings regardless of whether we are Hindus, Christians
:or Buddhists -- for example to respect each other's human rights. If we are to
:have human rights at all, those obligations must be present whether we have
:voluntarily adopted them or not. If they were purely voluntary we could just say
:"Sorry, I haven't adopted them so they don't apply to me" and carry on
:torturing.
:D.K. To Craig-I think rights introduce a new perspective *historically*, but that
:rights were always implicit in the preceptual requirements. I don't think the
:precepts are merely ways to reduce suffering, and would say they are
:fundamentally requirements of justice. Following the precepts DOES reduce
:suffering, but this is a side-effect, just as observing the law keeps you out of
:prison. However, we should observe the precepts and the law because they're
:just, not because they keep you out of prison.
It is clear from these 2 passages what we have very different views on the main thrust of buddhism and the role of justice within buddhism. For me, the primary and unique thrust of buddhism is toward liberations of all sentients beings through enlightenment. Reduction of sufferings can contribute to this goal. Justice can reduce suffering and is an important adjunct. But there are certainly situation where one can reduce suffering without always insisting on equity.
My take is that the Buddha was never here to pass judgements on us. He made observations on the nature of being and invited us to verify them. He laid down precepts to help us practice in community, but not commandments to save or rule the world. We may just have to agree to disagree on this thread.
Regards,
A. Chu
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At 02:24 PM 10/9/95 -0400, Sally Clay wrote:
>Perhaps "fixed ethical standard determined by the consent of citizens" might be a more usable standard than "absolute"?
Is there something we can possibly replace that "fixed" with? How about "common," or "contemporary," or "known," or even "world-wide."
That is unless you want to get everyone to agree that "fixed" isn't really Fixed.
-----
Sphere.
On Sun, 8 Oct 1995, Damien Keown wrote:
>It is hard to see how there can be universal human rights unless we have some absolute ethical standard to base our judgements on. Compassion, dependent-origination, and human dignity have all been proposed in this conference as providing such a foundation. I accept that speaking in these terms >does not sit well with some interpretations of Buddhism and at least on the surface with certain doctrines. On the other hand, Buddhist teachings do proclaim universal truths about the world, human nature, and its ultimate destiny. The Dharma is unchanging, and includes moral teachings, as in the Fourth Noble Truth. There are thus good grounds for saying that Buddhism teaches there are universal moral standards.
>Buddhists who reject this idea, however, must then either i) explain how they ground their belief in universal human rights in the absence of such standards,
>or ii) reject the idea of human rights as incompatible with Buddhism. Anyone who
>adopts ii), however, would have dubious grounds for objecting to Chinese labour
>camps in Tibet and the examples of human rights abuses against women of the kind mentioned by Hilary Clinton in her speech.
>Cheers,
>Damien Keown
There are other alternatives than the apparent dilemma Prof. Keown posts in the last paragraph. Buddhism in my view, let me repeat, neither asserts nor denies that it is compatible with human rights. Thus it is perfectly possible that a Buddhist goes about protesting such acts as torturing and other forms of human rights violations, but such a Buddhist has to bear in mind that the protesting actions be done with the right attitude. That is, the Buddhist has to realize that the ultimate aim of an, any, individual is to release himself or herself of suffering. With this aim in mind, the Buddhist can surely progress toward the path by helping others, for by doing so the helper himself is right on the path. The content of helping is very wide, and includes actions at the social level. So the help certainly includes such social actions as civil disobedience, organizing mass movement, work stoppage, and other similar means, aimed at realizing particular objectives against unjust power. I see these actions not incompatible at all with the teaching of Buddhism, even though it does not have anything specific to say about them. However, what Buddhism does teach is that the actions must not be performed with anger, delusion or hatred.
This directly implies that the proper social actions for Buddhists must be *non-violent*. I think if any this is the one Buddhist requirement for social actions. And I believe no one would disagree on this.
Sometimes, however, non-violence does not seem to be able to realize the objectives, at least in the minds of some ardent activists. These activists argue for some channels where violence is permitted to achieve objectives they believe to be just, and to be effective against the unjust power. But this type of belief just runs counter to the Buddhist tenet, and I see no way how Buddhism could be molded to fit this type of attitude. One must always be aware of one's own kamma, and according to Buddhism the only *telos* of an individual is his or her own realizing of the Path. (Here I disagree with my respected colleagues of the Mahayaana tradition.) Hence if one does one's act with violence, which naturally involves hatred and anger, then one does *oneself* a kind of 'harm,' for one then diverges from the Path.
Does this mean that Buddhists remain always pacified and docile? By no means, for non-violent actions can achieve ends more effectively than violent ones. Consider a mass strike. If done properly and with clearly defined and stated objectives supported by the majority of the people, then it becomes a potent weapon against the unjust rulers. And I strongly advocate such movement against rulers who blatantly disregard respect for human rights.
While these actions are indeed justified in response to abuses of human rights, this to me is dissociated from the philosophical nature of justification Prof. Keown seems to want. He seems to believe that, without the 'universality' of human rights being properly grounded through some true philosophy, claims by fighters and activists would not carry weight. I disagree. The people on the street or the activists could not care any less about philosophy. How, then, are they supposed to know that the rights they are advocating are 'universal' and 'well grounded' hence 'true'?--a philosopher of Prof. Keown's bent might ask. My reply is that they don't have, qua activists, to be concerned with the philosophical problem of grounding; they, moreover, do not even need to believe that such rights are universal. They merely need believe that such rights will bring them good life and a way out of the reign of terror they are suffering in. And since rights are a guarantee--necessarily coupled with proper rule of law and effective legal institutions, of course--of such life the people and activists envision, it is not difficult to imagine people fighting for them. They fight for some kind of power they can have--legal entitlements against arbitrary abuse of power. This seems to be adequate for them; the reason is that, in my view, rights are only that; they are not groundable on any type of universalist reasons.
Is my view here compatible with Buddhism? I would say yes. However, one has to bear in mind that such quibblings about the philosophical nature of rights are comparable to the leaves in the forest the Buddha prefers not to talk about. I take it that this is the genuine Buddhist attitude toward such a problem. Which by no means implies that a Buddhist, a lay Buddhist suffering from an unjust, abusive regime, has no right to improve his or her living, as a citizen and as a lay person.
Soraj Hongladarom
Department of Philosophy
Chulalongkorn University
Bangkok, Thailand
>>>Sally Clay9/10/95, 08:24pm >>>
Michel Clasquin wrote:
-------- start quote --------
>>>Damien Keown <100012.3212@compuserve.com> 8/10/95, 12:37pm >>>
>>It is hard to see how there can be universal human rights unless we have some absolute ethical standard to base our judgements on.
^^^^^^^^
>Precisely. Now let's see how that went again?
>"Samma sankharaa anicca"
>If *everything* is impermanent, in what sense is it absolute? I remain unconvinced that HR is consonant with core Buddhist teachings except as an upaya. The metaphysics simply don't match up.
-------- end quote --------
Perhaps "fixed ethical standard determined by the consent of citizens" might be a more usable standard than "absolute"?
I have no problems with that at all. Although we'd have to realise that it would only be "fixed" until the consent changed.The question then is, what would the distinctively Buddhist contribution be to molding the citizens' consent? And that, I think is a worthwhile topic for debate. Anyone?
Michel Clasquin
>>>peter.harvey9/10/95, 05:02pm >>>
<<<<<'It is hard to see how there can be universal human rights unless we have some absolute ethical stadard to base our judgements on'.
Michael Clasquin, replied:
'... If *everything* is impermanent, in what sense is it absolute? I remain uncovinced that HR is consonant with core Buddhist teachings except as an upaya. The metaphysics simply don't add up'.
Is it the case that 'all conditioned things are impermanent' applies to //principles// as well as mental and physical states/events? Is the principle 'all conditioned things are impermanent' 'impermanent'?
I'd respond by asking if this principle exists *as a principle* without being present as a mental state. Back in the precambrian period, things changed, quite naturally. But the *principle* "all phenomena are impermanent" didn't exist until it was formulated as a hypothesis to explain observed phenomena. Another example: for a long time, it was a principle that the earth was the centre of the universe. That principle has now changed. One cannot just regard principles as floating around in the abstract, divorced from their embodiment in (human?) thought. That road takes us all the way back to Plato's ideal forms.
But this is material for the first week. I think all our positions are on the table now, and it's time to move on to the issues for the second. I'd be happy to continue this thread privately, though.
Michel Clasquin
>>>Soraj Hongladarom10/10/95, 06:58am >>>
There are other alternatives than the apparent dilemma Prof. Keown posts in the last paragraph. Buddhism in my view, let me repeat, neither asserts nor denies that it is compatible with human rights. Thus it is perfectly possible that a Buddhist goes about protesting such acts as torturing and other forms of human rights violations, but such a Buddhist has to bear in mind that the protesting actions be done with the right attitude.
How, then, are they supposed to know that the rights they are advocating are 'universal' and 'well grounded' hence 'true'?--a philosopher of Prof. Keown's bent might ask. My reply is that they don't have, qua activists, to be concerned with the philosophical problem of grounding; they, moreover, do not even need to believe that such rights are universal. They merely need believe that such rights will bring them good life and a way out of the reign of terror they are suffering in. And since rights are a guarantee--necessarily coupled with proper rule of law and effective legal institutions, of course--of such life the people and activists envision, it is not difficult to imagine people fighting for them. They fight for some kind of power they can have--legal entitlements against arbitrary abuse of power. This seems to be adequate for them; the reason is that, in my view, rights are only that; they are not groundable on any type of universalist reasons.
Soraj Hongladarom
Department of Philosophy
Chulalongkorn University
Bangkok, Thailand
I strongly endorse this view
Michel Clasquin
RITR, Unisa
>>>>Damien Keown <100012.3212@compuserve.com> 8/10/95, 12:37pm >>>
>>It is hard to see how there can be universal human rights unless we have some absolute ethical standard to base our judgements on.
^^^^^^^^^
>Precisely. Now let's see how that went again?
>"Samma sankharaa anicca"
>If *everything* is impermanent, in what sense is it absolute? I remain unconvinced that HR is consonant with core Buddhist teachings except as an upaya. The metaphysics simply don't match up.
>Michel Clasquin
Cher Michel:
Absolutely impermanent! How else. Vraiment, ne c'est pas?? Core buddhist teachings are themselves (sunawachi) upaya - it's all useful lies, not a final creed. The metaphysics never match up, but that goodness there's no karma cost accountants to balance the books by means of generally accepted accounting principles - to do so requires dogmatists or philosophers.
Gassho,
Ken O'Neill
>At 17:53 06/10/95 -0400, A. Chu wrote:
>>We might all agree that he respected others. To say that he 'respected the //rights// of others' is casting a specific interpretation.
>Yes, indeed. It's offering an analytical account of his behaviour to show (I hope!) that his conduct is intelligible in terms of -- and perfectly consistent with -- the concept of rights. I am suggesting that the Buddha's conduct can be explained quite intelligibly by reference to the concept of rights, and that if this is correct there is no bar to Buddhists today making use of the concept to promote the cause of human rights.
>>I have no problem with buddhists participating fully in the realms of law or ethics or politics. I do feel that we need to be clear about the type of discourse we are engaging in. Rights Talk are in the realm of law, but more so in the realm of politics, IMHO.
>The discourse of rights crosses many disciplinary boundaries including morals, law and politics. The law comes in to enforce what we believe to be morally right (this oversimplifies things, but I think it holds in the case of human rights at least). In other words, we want the law to enforce human rights because we believe them to be just and fair.
>Example: the First Precept prohibits murder, and most countries have a law prohibiting homicide. Yes, we can say one is the realm of morals, the other is the realm of law, but why is the fact that the law intrudes problematic? Laws are a requirement of social life -- we need legal sanctions because not everyone
>acts morally of their own volition.
What distinquishs shila from secular law is intent and praxis. For buddhists, the intent is not to follow the law (once in the robe, you've declared yourself out of caste, an out law), but to uphold patterns of living maximizing peace of mind and emergence of awakening. Secular law has no concept of spiritual illumination, so it would count as a provisional teaching at best.
Gassho,
Ken O'Neill