Splicing Traditions



On this topic
Date: Wed, 04 Oct 1995 12:26:22 -0600
From: Charles Strain
Subject: Splicing Traditions
I am having difficulty keeping up with the many thoughtful clarifications that are being made about the definition of human rights and about the relationship of the concept to Buddhism. So, at the risk of being redundant let me add four contributions.

1. Human rights language like other forms of moral discourse is a mixed discourse. A number of commentators, notably Steve Jamar, have argued against viewing rights narrowly as so-called negative rights or civil liberties. Instead Jamar's interventions have shown that a human rights tradition has been constituted by multiple sources which have contributed decidedly different perspectives on just what are human rights. The U.N. declaration represents an amalgamation of multiple perspectives. So, I would refer to human rights language as representing a complex tradition rather than a self-contained discourse with rigorous standards of coherence.

2. Splicing Traditions. If this first distinction is helpful, I would suggest further that when any tradition encounters another tradition full compatibility is not something one can hope for. Rather traditions can be spliced. In this process Catholics or Buddhists, for example, will necessarily criticize some elements of the human rights tradition, appropriate others, and modify key elements. The resulting combination offers the possibility of pushing the other tradition (in this case the human rights tradition) in some new directions. I look forward, for example to how Buddhist notions of interdependence and "interbeing" will enable the human rights tradition itself to evolve. As something of an outsider to the debates of this conference, I am a bit disappointed that the discussion, mainly, has focused upon whether or not Buddhists can appropriate this other tradition and not upon the more challenging issue of how Buddhists distinctively (perhaps in league with other religious traditions) might push the human rights tradition to a new stage of its evolution.

3. Defining Human Rights. With these distinctions in mind I would suggest that there is an evolving _field_ of human rights and we can clarify the boundaries of this field with _three_ conceptual distinctions. a) Rights can be thought of as immunities and as supports. (I prefer this language to the more frequent usage of "negative" and "positive" rights. b) Rights can be thought of as applying to the maintenance of or the actualization of "person- in-community," in David Hollenbach's apt phrase.

Think of these two distinctions as creating two intersecting axes with four quadrants defining the field. So, we have the right not to be tortured as an immunity right refering to the maintenance of p in c. Freedom of religion would be an immunity right pertaining to the actualization of p in c. Basic rights to food, shelter etc. would be a claim to support the maintenance of p in c. While the right to an education would be a claim to support the actualization of p in c.

c) I made another distinction, following David Hollenbach, in my paper. Rights are intrinsic or instrumental. The former are in some sense "absolute" the latter are historically relative. The right to education would be an intrinsic right; the right to, say, educational vouchers would be an instrumental right applicable to a particular social circumstance.

4. Finally, it is obvious that in this expanded understanding rights are more than claims upon governments. Governments will not in all cases be the social institutions which are obligated to meet right claims. Here too we break with defining rights in excluvisely legalistic terms. There is a pragmatic reason lurking behind this last distinction. As I argued in my paper, I am convinced that the agents for expanding and securing rights are not now and will not be primarily governments. The latter will be pushed and dragged into a more just future if they move at all. They will respond to the efforts of NGO's primarily out of utilitarian considerations. So, I would ask my Buddhist colleagues, as I did in my paper, to consider how we build bridges to work together toward shared ends.

None of these comments changes my and many others' convictions that rights language alone insufficiently represents the full moral implications of any of our religious traditions.

Charles R. Strain
DePaul University
Date: Thu, 05 Oct 1995 13:00:25 -0400
From: "Damien Keown (by way of wrh7@psu.edu Wayne R. Husted)" <100012.3212@compuserve.com>
Subject: Splicing Traditions
At 12:26 04/10/95 -0600, Charles Strain wrote:

>As something of an
>outsider to the debates of this conference, I am a bit disappointed that the discussion, mainly, has focused upon whether or not Buddhists can appropriate this other tradition and not upon the more challenging issue of how Buddhists distinctively (perhaps in league with other religious traditions) might push the human rights tradition to a new stage of its evolution.

I share this concern and would like to see the debate move forwards in this direction. However, I think Buddhism is not really in a position to offer very much in this connection just yet, as it is still struggling to digest the concept of human rights rather than being able to suggest new ways it might evolve.

In my position paper I outlined four questions:

1) Is the concept of "rights" appropriate in a Buddhist context? 2) Even if Buddhism CAN invoke the language of rights, should it do so? 3) How is a doctrine of human rights to be grounded in Buddhist doctrine? 4) What is the appropriate Buddhist response in the face of human rights abuses?

The first two questions seem to have been aired fairly thoroughly, and it seems, at least, that the main positions are out in the open. I think that is very useful, and perhaps as much as can be hoped for in terms of this conference. The third question has been touched upon, but not explored in detail. As this seems to be the source from which a distinctive Buddhist contribution to the human rights tradition must come, perhaps to conclude the first week of the conference it might be appropriate to give some attention to this issue. (The final question 4) can be discussed next week.)

Distinctive Buddhist approach to human rights might be formulated in terms of the doctrine of dependent-origination or by reference to compassion. Would anyone like to speak in favour of either of these?

Damien Keown
Date: Thu, 05 Oct 1995 21:28:50 -0700
From: Ken O'Neill
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
>At 12:26 04/10/95 -0600, Charles Strain wrote:

>>As something of an
>>outsider to the debates of this conference, I am a bit disappointed that the discussion, mainly, has focused upon whether or not Buddhists can appropriate this other tradition and not upon the more challenging issue of how Buddhists distinctively (perhaps in league with other religious traditions) might push the human rights tradition to a new stage of its evolution.

>I share this concern and would like to see the debate move forwards in this direction. However, I think Buddhism is not really in a position to offer very much in this connection just yet, as it is still struggling to digest the concept of human rights rather than being able to suggest new ways it might evolve.

>In my position paper I outlined four questions:

>1) Is the concept of "rights" appropriate in a Buddhist context? 2) Even if Buddhism CAN invoke the language of rights, should it do so? 3) How is a doctrine of human rights to be grounded in Buddhist doctrine? 4) What is the appropriate Buddhist response in the face of human rights abuses?

>The first two questions seem to have been aired fairly thoroughly, and it seems,
>at least, that the main positions are out in the open. I think that is very useful, and perhaps as much as can be hoped for in terms of this conference. The
>third question has been touched upon, but not explored in detail. As this seems to be the source from which a distinctive Buddhist contribution to the human rights tradition must come, perhaps to conclude the first week of the conference
>it might be appropriate to give some attention to this issue. (The final question 4) can be discussed next week.)

>Distinctive Buddhist approach to human rights might be formulated in terms of the doctrine of dependent-origination or by reference to compassion. Would anyone like to speak in favour of either of these?

>Damien Keown


I agree with the tone of your post. We of the West have learned to look on buddhisms through the rear view mirror; too often, our Asian buddhist leadership has led us to such outlooks. We either look for dividing lines (Tibetan v Japanese, for example) or sweeping generalizations (Buddhist compassion means xyz), all formulated in terms of what buddhism was. Have you noticed that throughout these postings Nishitani's A Study of the Good, along with others of the Kyoto School movement, haven't been referred to; in my opinion, that's sad because the Kyoto School has been the leading edge of twentieth century buddhadharma. The notions of rights is exactly the kind of issue the Kyoto School would relish doing high level synthesis with, thereby creating A next step in buddhist development.

In practice, engi (dependent origination) is a technique for deconstructing one's habitual experience of reality. I'm frankly at a loss to guess how to apply it.

Karuna, on the other hand, seems a natural meeting place for interreligious dialogue and development of a global spiritual outlook on rights. An excellent one at that. Why? You just can't get preachy nor sanctimonious with buddhist compassion (excepting some japanese buddhist fundamentalist movements). The art of bodhisattva/persons of awakening living depends on this one sole awakening - the by seeing through the social illusion, compassion may natural emerge. In that regard, an emergent global spiritual sense can transcend imposed notions of doing-good in favor of a natural heart of life affirming values (karuna). And practical methods supporting its emergence.

That symptom of modernity and post-industrialism we know as existential despair, the dukha of Western civilization comes close to Buddhist emptiness. Close. But rooted in the "meaning and guilt" syndrome of Western European religiousity, existential emptiness in an absurd world (God is dead and dethroned, the world meaningless, and humans masses of protoplasm devoid of spirit) plunges one into real time despair and alienation. No small wonder the number one ailment of Americans as reported in poll after poll is loneliness. We don't know how to savor emptiness, much less how to discover the roots of intensely passionate compassion in the relief of emptiness.

My point, and that of buddhadharma as I understand it, is that compassion awakens WITH emptiness. And both grow together as consciousness transforms for the locus of tunnel blinded self to that of a growing bodhisattva in the works. Bodhisattvas can be Christians, Jews, anything with spiritual motivating maturation.

Hope this adds to your very good questions being amplified and discussed.

Gassho,

Ken O'Neill, Kyoshi
White Lotus Society
Tucson, Arizona
Date: Fri, 06 Oct 1995 01:23:07 -0400
From: williams
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
At 01:00 PM 10/5/95 -0400, Damien Keown wrote:

>Distinctive Buddhist approach to human rights might be formulated in terms of the doctrine of dependent-origination or by reference to compassion. Would anyone like to speak in favour of either of these?


It seems to me that compassion is an "ought," and as such is not suitable for invocation with respect to others. It is certainly a force which can explain being involved in human rights issues, but not for telling others to abide by "right action."

Dependent-origination is a "mechanism," and as such can be invoked in objectivist terms. It should be possible to formulate at least approximately what types of causes lead to what types of results. From dependent-origination we can say "if you beat up your citizens then they won't like you, and eventually they will find a way to overpower you."

Thus, I think dependent-origination should be argued out of compassion.

-----
Sphere.
Date: Fri, 06 Oct 1995 10:52:37 -0400
From: Jamie HUBBARD
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
Damien wrote:

>1) Is the concept of "rights" appropriate in a Buddhist context? 2) Even if Buddhism CAN invoke the language of rights, should it do so? 3) How is a doctrine of human rights to be grounded in Buddhist doctrine? 4) What is the appropriate Buddhist response in the face of human rights abuses?

>The first two questions seem to have been aired fairly thoroughly, and it seems,
>at least, that the main positions are out in the open. I think that is very useful, and perhaps as much as can be hoped for in terms of this conference. The
>third question has been touched upon, but not explored in detail. As this seems
>to be the source from which a distinctive Buddhist contribution to the human rights tradition must come, perhaps to conclude the first week of the conference
>it might be appropriate to give some attention to this issue. (The final question 4) can be discussed next week.)

It seems to me that the majority of discussants find the notion of human rights at least somewhat problematic in terms of 1) and 2); this in turn makes 3) and 4) rather difficult, don't you think? Although human rights as skillful means has been often mentioned, that too begs the question. But then, Buddhism will become what Buddhists do, and so, at least historically speaking, human rights is now part of the Buddhist tradition.

Responding to his own question 3), Damien writes:

>Distinctive Buddhist approach to human rights might be formulated in terms of the doctrine of dependent-origination or by reference to compassion. Would anyone like to speak in favour of either of these?

Although I don't think that either of these options will lead to a notion of rights both could probably serve as a basis for a notion of Buddhist *responsibility*, which, as somebody else has already noted, is not unlike a form of enlightened self-interest.

But what I would really like to ask about is the notion of social karma as a means of getting "purchase" in the political realm, that is, giving Buddhists a way of understanding *why* they should not be pursuing the only really worthwhile social good, i.e., nirvana.
-- remember Naagaarjuna's famous words of advice to the king, concluding his _Jewel Garland of Royal Counsels_: "But enlightened rule is difficult Due to the un-enlightenment of the world; So it is better you renounce the world, For the sake of true glory."
But social karma is rarely discussed in Buddhist texts (there was a thread on this topic some time ago on Buddha-L). Any thoughts?

Jamie
Date: Fri, 06 Oct 1995 11:12:26 -0400
From: Jamie HUBBARD
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
Ken O'Neill wrote:

>Have
>you noticed that throughout these postings Nishitani's A Study of the Good,
>along with others of the Kyoto School movement, haven't been referred to; in
>my opinion, that's sad because the Kyoto School has been the leading edge of
>twentieth century buddhadharma. The notions of rights is exactly the kind of
>issue the Kyoto School would relish doing high level synthesis with, thereby
>creating A next step in buddhist development.

This might be interesting indeed, considering how the Kyoto school was able to understand both Zen and Shin in such a way as to further the agenda of a militaristic regime not exactly well-known for respecting the rights of either its own citizens or other nationals. At a national scholary meeting in 1937 (the year that the _kokutai no hongi_ was published) Nishida Kitaro gave a plenary speech that declared,

"Japan has wholly preserved a *self-identity* with the Imperial family as the center."

At the same meeting Takakusu Junjiroo also said,

"Our nation, from the time of its founding, has been totalitarian. We have preserved that totalitariianism until today. . . One needs to fully comprehend the Kegon truth, with everything in perfect order, and should all should expect to devote themselves to public service with not a speck of self remaining. I long to see everybody forget their self, everybody discarding their self to the rule of the nation."

This is a good example of where the cosmic (Kegon) view of dependent origination can take you. An excellent discussion of dependent origination that everybody should read before putting it forward as a basis for a Buddhist notion of human rights is "Causation and //Telos//: The Problem of Buddhist Environmental Ethics" by Ian Harris, available right here from the JBE web server.
Jamie
Date: Fri, 06 Oct 1995 12:43:55 -0700
From: Ken O'Neill
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
>At 01:00 PM 10/5/95 -0400, Damien Keown wrote:

>>Distinctive Buddhist approach to human rights might be formulated in terms of the doctrine of dependent-origination or by reference to compassion. Would anyone like to speak in favour of either of these?


Sphere responded:

>It seems to me that compassion is an "ought," and as such is not suitable for invocation with respect to others. It is certainly a force which can explain being involved in human rights issues, but not for telling others to abide by "right action."

>Dependent-origination is a "mechanism," and as such can be invoked in objectivist terms. It should be possible to formulate at least approximately what types of causes lead to what types of results. From dependent-origination we can say "if you beat up your citizens then they won't like you, and eventually they will find a way to overpower you."

>Thus, I think dependent-origination should be argued out of compassion.

I don't know how compassion is an "ought." Self-interested good, including following orders or seeking to earn merit in exchange for action are ruled out as authentic compassion. In Japanese, such approachs are called hakkarai - self obsessed, calculated evil. In other words, you can't follow rules to earn good in buddhism; such action is taken as "evil." Compassion is the stuff persons of awakening are made of.

I can't quite comprehend engi/dependent origination as mechanism. Doing so harkens back to 19th century materialistic interpretations of Buddhism - you know, as the "religion of science." Engi is a technique for application to deconstruct samsara - the see through ordinary person and cultural delusions. When applied, perhaps we can come to see how mechancial our lives of ready made knee jerk reactions amount to.

Gassho,

Ken O'Neill, Kyoshi
White Lotus Society
Date: Fri, 06 Oct 1995 18:21:00 -0700
From: Ken O'Neill
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
>Ken O'Neill wrote:

>>Have
>>you noticed that throughout these postings Nishitani's A Study of the Good,
>>along with others of the Kyoto School movement, haven't been referred to; in
>>my opinion, that's sad because the Kyoto School has been the leading edge of
>>twentieth century buddhadharma. The notions of rights is exactly the kind of
>>issue the Kyoto School would relish doing high level synthesis with, thereby
>>creating A next step in buddhist development.

>Jamie Hubbard responded:

>This might be interesting indeed, considering how the Kyoto school was able to
>understand both Zen and Shin in such a way as to further the agenda of a militaristic regime not exactly well-known for respecting the rights of either its own citizens or other nationals. At a national scholary meeting in 1937 (the year that the _kokutai no hongi_ was published) Nishida Kitaro gave a plenary speech that declared,

>"Japan has wholly preserved a *self-identity* with the Imperial family as the center."

>At the same meeting Takakusu Junjiroo also said,

>"Our nation, from the time of its founding, has been totalitarian. We have preserved that totalitariianism until today. . . One needs to fully comprehend the Kegon truth, with everything in perfect order, and should all should expect to devote themselves to public service with not a speck of self remaining. I long to see everybody forget their self, everybody discarding their self to the rule of the nation."


Much the same can be said of Martin Heidegger. One seriously doubts, however, Jamie would contend study of the Kyoto School movement should be limited to statements of two of its participants in the era preceding and during World War II, much less confine Heidegger studies to that same period. Publications in Japanese and English translation of that movement are more aptly characterizable as a post WWII phenomena.

>This is a good example of where the cosmic (Kegon) view of dependent origination can take you.

Jamie: could you explain this cryptic remark? It's point is lost!?!?

An excellent discussion of dependent
>origination that everybody should read before putting it forward as a basis for a Buddhist notion of human rights is "Causation and //Telos//: The Problem of Buddhist Environmental Ethics" by Ian Harris, available right here from the JBE web server.

Thanks for the tip.

Ken
Date: Sat, 07 Oct 1995 15:54:00 -0400
From: williams
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
At 12:43 PM 10/6/95 -0700, Ken O'Neill wrote:
AAAt 01:00 PM 10/5/95 -0400, Damien Keown wrote:

>>>Distinctive Buddhist approach to human rights might be formulated in terms of the doctrine of dependent-origination or by reference to compassion. Would anyone like to speak in favour of either of these?


>Sphere responded:

>>It seems to me that compassion is an "ought," and as such is not suitable for invocation with respect to others. It is certainly a force which can explain being involved in human rights issues, but not for telling others to abide by "right action."

>>Dependent-origination is a "mechanism," and as such can be invoked in objectivist terms. It should be possible to formulate at least approximately what types of causes lead to what types of results. From dependent-origination we can say "if you beat up your citizens then they won't like you, and eventually they will find a way to overpower you."

>>Thus, I think dependent-origination should be argued out of compassion.

>I don't know how compassion is an "ought." Self-interested good, including following orders or seeking to earn merit in exchange for action are ruled out as authentic compassion. In Japanese, such approachs are called hakkarai - self obsessed, calculated evil. In other words, you can't follow rules to earn good in buddhism; such action is taken as "evil." Compassion is the stuff persons of awakening are made of.


There is compassion as viewed from within by the compassionate being, and there is compassion as viewed externally (perhaps by non-compassionate beings).

For the compassionate being "reduce killing" is obvious. There is no question to be asked or answered. When viewed externally, however, this compassionate truth comes across as "you ought to reduce killing." This compassionate truth has no power to motivate the non-compassionate being. It is ineffective as method.

Compassion requires that an effective method be found, but compassion is not that effective method. Compassion may be the reason for a distinctive Buddhist method, but it cannot be the method.



>I can't quite comprehend engi/dependent origination as mechanism. Doing so harkens back to 19th century materialistic interpretations of Buddhism - you know, as the "religion of science." Engi is a technique for application to deconstruct samsara - the see through ordinary person and cultural delusions. When applied, perhaps we can come to see how mechancial our lives of ready made knee jerk reactions amount to.


I think you are throwing out the baby with the bathwater here. Again, dependent origination can be viewed internally and externally. Viewed internally it tells us the stuff of which we are made. Viewed externally it shows us the pieces of creation. Certainly, viewing dependent origination in small hunks reduces to materialism -- but materialism has proved effective in producing change. If the objective is to motivate non-compassionate beings to compassionate ends then an effective method must be found for creating this motivation. I think pointing out small pieces of the web of creation can serve as at least an initial foothold in this regard. Obviously, compassion should lead us to pushing on the door, and not being satisfied with a mere foot in the door -- at the same time compassion should tell us not to push the door in their face.

-----
Sphere.
Date: Sat, 07 Oct 1995 17:52:36 -0400
From: Jamie HUBBARD
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
>>This is a good example of where the cosmic (Kegon) view of dependent origination can take you.

>Jamie: could you explain this cryptic remark? It's point is lost!?!?

The point is Takakusu's invoking Kegon doctrine as one in which all of the parts do their share to create the whole. This is the "philosophy of harmony," oft rooted in the Hua-yen ideas (as in Emp. Shomu and the Daibutsu, for example) that some have taken to calling an "ideology of conformity." You know, that famous Japanese proverb of human rights: "the nail that sticks out gets pounded down." It is also, I believe, what Harris' paper talks about as a spatial rather than temporal understanding of dependent origination.

Regarding the Kyoto school, it is true, of course, that wartime statements of Japanese Buddhists and philosophers need to be handled carefully-- but the point, then, is to ask just how the *structure* of their philosophies has changed, if at all. As I endeavoured to show in an article on Tanabe Hajime's thought, his prewar logic of species and his postwar logic of metanoia are structurally the same and this structure *precludes the possiblity* of social justice because it is a form of absolutism.

Jamie
Date: Sat, 07 Oct 1995 19:12:02 -0700
From: Ken O'Neill
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
>>>This is a good example of where the cosmic (Kegon) view of dependent origination can take you.

>>Jamie: could you explain this cryptic remark? It's point is lost!?!?

>The point is Takakusu's invoking Kegon doctrine as one in which all of the parts do their share to create the whole. This is the "philosophy of harmony," oft rooted in the Hua-yen ideas (as in Emp. Shomu and the Daibutsu, for example) that some have taken to calling an "ideology of conformity." You know, that famous Japanese proverb of human rights: "the nail that sticks out gets pounded down." It is also, I believe, what Harris' paper talks about as a spatial rather than temporal understanding of dependent origination.

>Regarding the Kyoto school, it is true, of course, that wartime statements of Japanese Buddhists and philosophers need to be handled carefully-- but the point, then, is to ask just how the *structure* of their philosophies has changed, if at all. As I endeavoured to show in an article on Tanabe Hajime's thought, his prewar logic of species and his postwar logic of metanoia are structurally the same and this structure *precludes the possiblity* of social justice because it is a form of absolutism.

>Jamie


Jamie:
Thanks for an insightful response. Where's your article published? Would greatly like to read it.

Thanks,

ken o'neill
Date: Sun, 08 Oct 1995 00:18:22 -0400
From: "M. Jinavamsa"
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
Re Kitaro and Takakusu Junjiroo:
Can the below two quotations be traced back to obtainable sources? thank you for the reference.
Jinavamsa

In a message dated 95-10-07 09:57:20 EDT, you write:

>At a national scholary
>>meeting in 1937 (the year that the _kokutai no hongi_ was published) Nishida Kitaro gave a plenary speech that declared,

>>"Japan has wholly preserved a *self-identity* with the Imperial family as the center."

>>At the same meeting Takakusu Junjiroo also said,

>>"Our nation, from the time of its founding, has been totalitarian. We have preserved that totalitariianism until today. . . One needs to fully comprehend the Kegon truth, with everything in perfect order, and should all should expect to devote themselves to public service with not a speck of self remaining. I long to see everybody forget their self, everybody discarding their self to the rule of the nation."
Date: Sun, 08 Oct 1995 19:48:34 -0400
From: Jamie HUBBARD
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
>Re Kitaro and Takakusu Junjiroo:
>Can the below two quotations be traced back to obtainable sources? thank you for the reference.
>Jinavamsa

My source is Matsumoto Shiroo, "Bukkyoo to shingi: han nipponteki kosatsu [Buddhism and the Kami: In Opposition to Japanese Ethnocentrism]" in _Engi to ku: nyoraizoo shisoo hihan_ [Dependent Origination and Emptiness: A Critique of Tathaagatagarbha Thought]. Matsumoto in turn cites Nakajima Kenzo, _Showa jidai_ [The Showa Era] (Iwanami Shinsho, 1957, pp. 125-126; see also Kamato Shigeo, "Kegontetsugaku no konponteki tachiba [The Fundamental Standpoint of Kegon Philosophy]" in Kegon shisoo (Hoozookan, 1960), pp. 448-449, n. 5.




Jamie
Date: Mon, 09 Oct 1995 19:14:47 -0400
From: "M. Jinavamsa"
Subject: Re: Splicing Traditions
Dear Jamie,
aringato gozaimasu, but given the limits of my Japanese, actually, I was hoping for something, say, in Engish (or even French, German, SPanish, Italian, ...) But thank you for giving the references anyway. Are there, relevantly, any sources on these philosophers/thinkers/writers in Western languages? thank you again,
Jinavamsa

In a message dated 95-10-08 20:23:35 EDT, you write:

>ubj: Re: Splicing Traditions
>Date: 95-10-08 20:23:35 EDT
>From: JHUBBARD@ernestine.smith.edu (Jamie HUBBARD)
Sender: JBE-L@PSUVM.PSU.EDU (jbe-l conference) >Reply-to: JBE-L@PSUVM.PSU.EDU (jbe-l conference)
>To: JBE-L@PSUVM.PSU.EDU (Multiple recipients of list JBE-L)

>>Re Kitaro and Takakusu Junjiroo:
>>Can the below two quotations be traced back to obtainable sources? thank
yyou
>>for the reference.
>>Jinavamsa

>My source is Matsumoto Shiroo, "Bukkyoo to shingi: han nipponteki kosatsu [Buddhism and the Kami: In Opposition to Japanese Ethnocentrism]" in _Engi to ku: nyoraizoo shisoo hihan_ [Dependent Origination and Emptiness: A Critique of Tathaagatagarbha Thought]. Matsumoto in turn cites Nakajima Kenzo, _Showa jidai_ [The Showa Era] (Iwanami Shinsho, 1957, pp. 125-126; see also Kamato Shigeo, "Kegontetsugaku no konponteki tachiba [The Fundamental Standpoint of Kegon Philosophy]" in Kegon shisoo (Hoozookan, 1960), pp. 448-449, n. 5.




>Jamie